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Critical Essay 
on 
Sorin Baiasu’s Kant and Sartre: Rediscovering Critical Ethics 
Sacha Golob (King’s College London) 
 
 
Comparative work in the history of philosophy is a difficult thing to do well. It requires 
bringing into dialogue systems and arguments which are, even when close chronological and 
intellectual connections exist, often driven by very different ambitions and pressures, and 
which are frequently couched in terminological and conceptual frameworks untranslatable 
without remainder. Yet such comparative work is also extremely important. This is in part 
because of the complex and distinctive relation between philosophy and its past. It was for 
Kant, and for many of his successors within European thought, both natural and necessary to 
vindicate their work in part by relating it to pre-existing dialectics and texts: above all, by 
providing a type of error theory, an explanation of how one might plausibly arrive at, say 
Humean empiricism, and yet why it was nevertheless fundamentally mistaken - a tactic that 
at times achieves something close to methodological dominance once one reaches Hegel and 
Heidegger. 
 In his book, Sorin Baiasu examines what is, I think, a particularly important 
comparative case study, that of Kant and Sartre. Sartre himself is often scathing of the 
Critical tradition – for example, his Notebooks for an Ethics dismissively suggests that, in the 
face of “concrete” moral problems such as “collaboration or resistance”, “Kantianism teaches 
us nothing”.1 Yet there are undoubtedly links between the two thinkers, links which suggest 
that each might provide a distinctive and informative perspective from which to view the 
other. Most obviously, perhaps, Sartre places a colossal emphasis on freedom. Indeed, those 
who oppose the Kantian focus on autonomy often see Sartre as the culmination of that 
pernicious trend: consider Iris Murdoch with her denunciation – well written, poorly thought 
through – of “Kantian man” as Milton’s Lucifer, and her closely related and vociferous 
opposition to Sartre.2 Yet it is far from obvious how exactly the connections should be spelt 
out: commentators on Kant, for example, often invoke existentialism as an example of how 
things might go awry in the sphere of practical reasoning. Consider this from Reagan: 
At the end of “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” Christine Korsgaard 
suggests that perhaps the only way we can account for the bindingness of the 
Hypothetical Imperative is to think reason requires us to be “heroic existentialists,” 
who choose projects for no reason at all and then stick to them in the face of 
competing inclination for no reason except that we chose them…I suppose someone 
with existentialist intuitions might find this admirable, but to me it seems pointless 
and empty.3 
Looking beyond freedom, similarly tantalising points of contact arise across a host of other 
areas. Sartre’s emphasis on consciousness and self-awareness was rendered disreputable 
within the Continental tradition first by Heidegger’s disavowal of mental state talk and then 
by the various funerals for the subject that energised structuralism and post-structuralism. Yet 
                                               
1 Sartre 1992:7. 
2 Murdoch 1970:80. 
3 Reagan 2002:278 (I have inverted the order of these sentences). 
2 
 
that very same emphasis brings him into close proximity with Kant, and offers the chance of 
another angle on core Kantian apparatus such as apperception. In short, there is a lot to be 
gained by a better understanding of the Kant-Sartre relationship.   
 Baiasu’s text is therefore very welcome: it offers an impressively perceptive and 
rigorous treatment of many of the key aspects of that relationship. It moves fluidly between 
Kant’s theoretical and practical works, and across Sartre’s writings from Transcendence of 
the Ego through to the 1965 Cornell lectures. I agree with much of what Baiasu says, and the 
subtlety with which he maps Sartre’s evolution in particular, for example in chapter 6, is very 
welcome. But I want in this paper to press on three central issues, where I would like to hear 
a little more from him. The first is the link between consciousness and self-consciousness, a 
topic obviously of foundational importance for both Kant and phenomenology. The second 
and third are normativity and freedom: here Sartre’s attacks on Kant, many of which echo 
points made by German Idealism, are comparatively straightforward, but the rest of the 
picture is less so.  
 
(§1) Consciousness and Self-Consciousness 
The importance of self-consciousness to Kant’s story is, I take it, obvious. As the 
Anthropology puts it in the section titled “On consciousness of oneself”: 
For the fact that the human being can have the ‘I’ in his representations raises him 
infinitely above all other living beings on earth…For this faculty (namely to think) is 
understanding. (Anth.:127) 
In the first Critique, the ‘I think’ is likewise identified as “the vehicle of all concepts 
whatever, and hence also of transcendental concepts” (KrV:A341/B399). One of the core 
aims of the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions is then to construct an argument 
linking this general form of the understanding with the specific capacities characteristic of 
category deployment, and the rich intentionality of an objective world which such capacities 
sustain (KrVA201/B246). In line with such an explanatory strategy, Kant insists that the 
awareness we have of the ‘I think’ is not itself the sort of awareness we might have of 
external world objects: instead “I exist as an intelligence that is merely conscious of its 
faculty for combination” (KrV:B158). 
 The question of self-consciousness is also, of course, absolutely central to Sartre. As 
Baiasu observes, matters are complicated here by developments between early texts such as 
Transcendence of the Ego and the more ‘mature’ work of Being and Nothingness: given the 
present context, I don’t want to pursue this type of Sartrean exegesis here, but I think that 
Baiasu’s picture of those changes is essentially correct.4 My interest, rather, is in the relation 
between Sartre’s magnum opus and Kant’s own position. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre 
argues that there is a biconditional relationship between consciousness and self-
consciousness. As he puts it: 
This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the 
only mode of existence in which it is possible to be conscious of something. Just as an 
extended object is compelled to exist according to three dimensions, so an intention, a 
pleasure, a grief can exist only as immediate self-consciousness.5 
                                               
4 Baiasu 2011:50. 
5 Sartre 1969:liv. 
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This basic principle is visible throughout the phenomenological tradition. As Husserl, puts it 
“[t]o be a subject is to be in the mode of being aware of oneself”.6 One can find the same 
view in Heidegger, perhaps most straightforwardly on those occasions when he is willing to 
use mental state talk: his 1928-9 lectures, for example, assert simply that “every 
consciousness is also self-consciousness”.7 Furthermore, whilst Husserl’s changing 
terminologies create certain textual complexities here, all of these authors are at pains to 
insist that such self-awareness is distinct both from the ordinary awareness we have of objects 
and from the type of explicit, thematic “consciousness of oneself” that one might find in 
deliberate introspection or reflection. As Sartre puts it, the explanatorily primary form of self-
awareness is “non-positional”.8 
 Bringing these points together, we can see that Kant and Sartre share a common 
commitment to two claims: that self-consciousness plays some essential role in our 
experience of the world, and that our awareness of ourselves is in some important sense not 
primarily an ‘object awareness’. These claims are both extraordinarily important and highly 
controversial; they provide a foundational link between Kant and Sartre. Baiasu’s first 
chapter provides a sketch of them, but then moves very rapidly to the question of character 
and personal identity over time – this is understandable given his ultimate focus on ethics, but 
it is also something of a shame in view of their central status. Indeed, as he observes himself 
“there seems to be little point in comparing further aspects of Kant’s and Sartre’s works” 
unless we can get clear on these basic issues.9 So I would like to prompt him to say a little 
more.  
 First, how does he understand the link between consciousness and self-consciousness 
in the two thinkers? One way to put the issue is this. It often seems as if Sartre endorses non-
positional self-awareness because he takes it to be a necessary condition on making sense of 
the idea of a conscious state.10 His line of argument would then be similar to that found in 
self representing theories of consciousness such as Kriegel’s. As Kriegel summarises: 
The resulting two-stepped argument unfolds as follows: (1) conscious states are states 
one is aware of being in; (2) states one is aware of being in are represented states; 
therefore, (3) conscious states are represented states; (4) when a state is represented, it 
is represented either by itself or by a different state; but, (5) there are good reasons to 
think a conscious state is not represented by a different state; therefore, (6) there are 
good reasons to think that a conscious state is represented by itself.11 
In comparison, however, it looks like this cannot be Kant’s understanding of self-
consciousness. The reason is that he takes non-rational animals to have conscious states in at 
least the thin sense of Kriegel’s premise 1 (see, for example, Log:64–5) and yet he denies 
them, as seen in the passage from the Anthropology, the ‘I think’. In other words, Kant and 
Sartre share a distinctive commitment to self-consciousness and yet appear to differ radically 
as to its warrant; if that is right, it is a fact of striking importance. Where does Baiasu stand 
on this? 
 Second, how does Baiasu understand the joint claim that this self-consciousness is 
necessarily distinct from object-awareness? In his book, he offers this explanation of the 
claim: 
                                               
6 Husserl 1973:151. 
7 Heidegger 2001:135. 
8 Sartre 1969: liii. 
9 Baiasu 2011:43. 
10 See, for example, Sartre 1969:xxviii. 
11 Kriegel and Williford 2006:10. 
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Recall that, on Sartre’s account, every consciousness is at the same time 
consciousness (of) itself, which means that this pre-reflective level of consciousness is 
always at work within human experience. But then, as a necessary condition of 
cognition, pre-reflective consciousness cannot become the object of cognizing 
consciousness.12 
This is not convincing: compare the fallacious argument that, since the eye is a necessary 
condition of visual experience, it cannot become the object of it. Baiasu further suggests that 
such self-consciousness lacks “any particular determination…it is empty”.13 There is surely 
something right here, but it would be interesting to hear more about the similarities and 
differences between this and apperception and Kant’s notion of formality: would the table of 
judgments which cashes the “I think” in KrV, for example, count as a “determination”? 
Baiasu makes a few brief remarks in this area when discussing Transcendence of the Ego, but 
a clear statement on Being and Nothingness would be helpful.14  
 Third, and more broadly, Kant’s account of self-consciousness is routinely criticised 
within the phenomenological tradition as overly intellectualist, mainly because of the links 
between self-consciousness and judgment set out in the Metaphysical Deduction. Baiasu 
provides useful discussion of Sartre’s refusal to privilege deliberation as a decision-making 
mechanism, but it would be good to have a direct statement from him on the canonical charge 
of intellectualism and apperception.15 
 
(§2) Morality and Normativity 
As I mentioned in the introduction, many of Sartre’s direct criticisms of Kantian morality are 
reminiscent of those found in German Idealism. So, for example, the Notebooks on Ethics 
rails against Kant’s focus on the “abstract universal” or the “abstract and formal” which 
supposedly renders his principles unable to provide substantive guidance in the richly 
textured situation of concrete ethical action. This line of thought is familiar, of course, from 
texts such as the Philosophy of Right. Baiasu provides a clear analysis as to how Kant might 
respond to Sartre’s point, for example by emphasising that maxim formulation must be done 
with a close eye on the changing “circumstances and characteristics” of the individual case. 
As he notes: 
Kant is not guided by the idea of a code of norms that ought to be applied in every 
situation…when he formulates the maxim for certain actions, a person has to invent 
the maxim and the exact formulation of the maxim will depend again on the singular 
characteristics of the situation the person is in, as well as on that person’s 
characteristics.16 
This seems exactly right to me; one might further supplement the Kantian defence with the 
sort of consideration, for example vis-à-vis the role of the various formulations of the moral 
law, which Kantians have typically employed to fend off Hegel’s accusations.17 
 When it comes to the relationship between Sartre’s positive proposals and the Critical 
system, however, there are two issues where I would like to press Baiasu further – what he 
says at present is suggestive, but I want to try to get absolutely clear on his reading and its 
                                               
12 Baiasu 2011:52. 
13 Baiasu 2011:52. 
14 Baiasu 2011:49. 
15 Baiasu 2011:60. 
16 Baiasu 2011:138. 
17 For example a persuasive and influential example, see ‘The Practice of Moral Judgment’ in Herman 1993. 
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commitments. The first concerns the role of interpersonal relations. Sartre’s work in the years 
after Being and Nothingness offers a much more nuanced picture of interpersonal relations 
and alterity than that text where “respect for the other’s freedom is an empty word” [le 
respect de la liberty d'autrui est un vain mot].18 As Baiasu notes, these relations increasingly 
take on a foundational normative role for Sartre, a role which is also central to Sartre’s error 
theory as to what went wrong with Kantianism. 
The freedom that for Kant upholds the categorical imperative is noumenal, therefore 
the freedom of another. It is separated by that slight stream of nothingness which 
suffices so that I am not it. It is the projection of the other in the noumenal world.19 
Part of the issue concerns noumenal freedom which I discuss in §3. But what I want to 
highlight here is the idea that the two world or two aspect distinction which drives the 
Kantian system is really an attempt to model the self-other interaction. In the years after 
Being and Nothingness, Sartre himself often suggests that it is only be engaging directly with 
this relation that ethics can be secured. Baiasu summarises the trend as follows: 
Sartre offers the following picture of normativity (more exactly, of the ontological 
source of normativity) and of Kant’s account of normativity. For him, interpersonal 
relations are a necessary ontological source of normative standards…On Kant’s 
account, however, Sartre notes, a person may follow a moral standard in isolation 
from the others, since her reason provides the standard which can guide the person in 
the attempt to act morally. This radical separation between reason and sensible 
incentives, Sartre suggests, is meant to precisely replace the distinction between two 
persons and the interpersonal relation, which is required for the existence of moral 
standards.20 
From a Kantian perspective here, I would like to hear more. On the one hand, Baiasu doesn’t 
say much about those Kantian texts which offers vividly concrete accounts of ethics and the 
interpersonal: I am thinking, for example, of the discussion of the “church” and the “ethical 
commonwealth” in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (RGV:101). On the other 
hand, does Baiasu think there is anything Kant might learn from this Sartrean approach? 
After all, one can imagine Kantian commentators who would simply dismiss it: appealing to 
interpersonal relations or a direct encounter with the other, unless it is coded talk for the 
formula of humanity, simply reintroduces all the issues of partiality that Kant found so 
problematic in empiricism. After all, how we respond to such an encounter is clearly biased 
by a host of factors – race, gender, etc. - which seem to render it inappropriate as an ethical 
basis. 
 The second point is a blunter one. There is a way reading of Being and Nothingness 
on which it is, frankly, hard to take that book seriously. On this interpretation, Sartre holds 
that the fact that you choose something is sufficient to make it choice worthy. This reading is 
a longstanding one – it is at the root of attacks on Sartre by figures as diverse as Merleau-
Ponty and Iris Murdoch. It also fits with a certain, cautionary narrative as to the Kant-Sartre 
relation, one on which Sartre represents a reductio of the consequences of combining a 
Kantian focus on the will and on autonomy with a loss of faith in the resources of pure 
reason. Now, it might be that this is indeed how Sartre thought, at least at that point in time. 
But if so, it seems disappointing and ironic that the existentialist most associated with ethics 
should be wedded to such a bankrupt and unrevealing model; after all, even Heidegger, no 
                                               
18 Sartre 1969:409. 
19 Sartre 1992:139.  
20 Baiasu 2011:140. 
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particular friend of first order normative theory, can be read as deploying the concept of 
authenticity within a mix of Aristotelian and Kantian strategies to yield something more 
sophisticated.21 So the question I have for Baiasu is this: does he hold that this was Sartre’s 
view in his major work, and if so, why should a Kantian take that text seriously? I ask 
because there are certainly passages where Baiasu appears to endorse such an interpretation. 
For example, he writes: 
According to Sartre’s account, which I think is incomplete here, in order to determine 
whether the end of a value is ‘to be realised’ by a person, we should simply determine 
whether or not the person has chosen that end; actual choice is in this case both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for the normativity of an end.22 
If this is Sartre’s view, “incomplete” seems generous to the point of euphemism. I would be 
particularly interested in seeing Baiasu flesh out the role of authenticity as he views it. If I 
understand him correctly, Baiasu confines authenticity to only a comparatively limited role; 
yet there are certainly passages, for example in the War Diaries, where Sartre’s formulations 
seem so close to Heidegger’s perfectionist view of it as a ‘duty’, that such confinement is 
exegetically questionable.23 If, alternately, Baiasu is willing to allow a stronger role for 
authenticity in Sartre’s ethics, then something needs to be said explicitly about how that role 
might either meet or avoid Kant’s sustained attacks on perfectionism. It might also be useful 
here to have a precise formulation of how Baiasu understands “L'esprit de serieux” which 
Sartre uses as a counterpoint to his own views. 
 Before moving on to freedom and its metaphysics, I want also to mention one purely 
Kantian issue which I would be interested to see clarified. In discussing Kant’s remarks on 
enlightenment, Baiasu offers a suggestive discussion of the categorical imperative and the 
various interpretations of contradiction in conception and in willing advanced by 
commentators such as O’Neill.24 Baiasu’s aim is to offer an alternative gloss on the idea of 
contradiction, a gloss on which the categorical imperative occupies a “constitutive role” in 
practical reasoning, parallel to the categories constitutive role in experience. I am not sure 
how immediately helpful the comparison with the categories is here: there are several quite 
distinct senses in which the various categories – mathematical or dynamical or both? – might 
be said to be constitutive for several quite different levels of experience. But what interests 
me most is the suggestion that being bound by the categorical imperative is, quite directly, a 
condition on engaging in practical reasoning. Baiasu writes: 
To raise the problem of how we ought to act means to make appeal to a standard of 
action. Assuming that this is a standard of moral goodness understood as objective, 
the standard would have to be universalisable. Hence the problem of the ought already 
invokes the moral criterion given by the Categorical Imperative.25 
Yet this is surely too quick. There is perhaps a good sense of universalisation entailed by the 
very idea of a standard or reason – although even here the issue of agent relative versus agent 
neutral reasons needs some discussion – but one surely cannot move form that to the much 
                                               
21 For discussion see, for example, chapter 6 of Golob 2014. 
22 Baiasu 2011:142-3. 
23 Baiasu 2011:226. As to the War Diaries, consider this, for example: 
Authenticity is a duty that comes to us both from outside and from inside since our ‘inside’ is an 
outside. To be authentic, is to fully realize one’s situated being, whatever that situation may be. (Sartre 
1984:53–4) 
For the same strand in Heidegger, see Heidegger 1983:246-8. 
24 Baiasu 2011:168. 
25 Baiasu 2011:170. 
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thicker sense of universalisation demanded by Kantian ethics; the coherence of rational 
egoism testifies to that. 
 
(§3) Freedom and Determinism 
Sartre makes a number of criticism of Kant’s views on freedom. At times, for example, he 
charges the Critical system with what Baiasu aptly calls “authoritarianism”.26 The complaint 
is effectively that the categorical imperative is an external imposition on the agent: to put the 
point another way, Sartre is suspicious as to how an act may be both autonomous and yet 
mandated by pure reason. But perhaps the most important aspect of this strand of the Kant-
Sartre dialogue concerns the metaphysical underpinnings of freedom. As I touched on in 
section 2, Sartre is highly suspicious of the noumenal apparatus posited by Kant to get his 
theory of freedom off the ground. Indeed, Being and Nothingness argues plainly that the idea 
of noumenal spontaneity is conceptually incoherent. Baiasu provides a neat formulation of 
Sartre’s complaint: 
[T]here is a contradiction in the idea of an unchanging spontaneity, since the very idea 
of spontaneity goes against that of a fixed, unchanging element. Hence on Sartre’s 
account, Kant would congeal the person in an “unchangeable denomination”, that of 
“the eternal subject who is never a predicate”. As such we do not really have a 
genuine spontaneity, a person who is really free.27 
At this point, the comparison with German Idealism is again useful, partly since I assume 
most Kantians will be more familiar with those texts than with Sartre’s. Recall for example, 
Hegel’s similar insistence that: 
Freedom and necessity as understood by abstract thinkers are not independently real, 
as these thinkers suppose, but merely ideal factors (moments) in the true freedom.28 
Now, there are undoubtedly problems created by Kant’s noumenal/phenomenal split, and 
individual Kantians will have their preferred methods of dealing with these, depending on 
familiar issues such as the choice between a two world, two aspect or other model of 
transcendental idealism. The challenge, however, for authors like Hegel and Sartre is that, 
whilst both stress those problems, neither wants to retreat to the type of straightforward 
Humean compatibilism which would entirely avoid them. The result is it can be hard for 
Kantians to see how exactly either author advances the conversation. Consider, for example, 
Ameriks, as always an extremely perceptive and charitable reader, who nevertheless 
summarises Hegel’s position as follows. 
What is disturbing about Hegel’s position is that, whilst he does appear to allow that 
absolute or ‘negative freedom’ is at least part of what man has, he does not put any 
effort into arguing for the possibility of such freedom (he appears to think it obvious 
on introspection). Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism is at least addressed to 
this issue, and it at least takes seriously the deterministic implications of science and 
social life. Hegel, however, simply tries to have the best of both worlds, that is, he 
builds on the metaphysical doctrine of our absolute freedom, whilst impugning 
traditional metaphysics and dismissing all particular arguments to the doctrine.29 
                                               
26 Baiasu 2011:135. 
27 Baiasu 2011:107. 
28 Hegel 1970:118 (§48/Z.VIII). 
29 Ameriks 2000:304. 
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The pressing worry is that a very similar accusation could be made against Sartre. In the 
book, Baiasu addresses this in part by discussing the interrelation between motive, cause and 
action in Sartre’s system. If I understand him correctly, Baiasu’s reconstruction is as follows. 
The cause of an action lies in the fact that “the current situation is apprehended as having to 
be changed, and this constitutes the cause of [the] action”.30 But the fact that the situation is 
so apprehended is a function of our projects; for example, rampant hunger might give me a 
reason to eat within one project, and a reason to remove myself from all food in another, such 
as fasting. The result is that: 
The cause of an action cannot determine the action; on the contrary, the cause is 
possible only insofar as there is a project of an action from the perspective of which 
the current state of the world is perceived as intolerable and having-to-be-changed.31 
Clearly, it is true that my goals determine what aspects of the world I see as requiring change. 
But none of this seems to remove the threat which worried Kant, namely that my goals or 
projects themselves, and so by extension my actions, are already simply the clockwork 
outcomes of a long running causal process over which I have neither power nor purview. I 
am unclear if Baiasu takes Sartre to resist this ‘freedom of the turnspit’ threat, and if so how 
exactly he thinks he does so. For example, there are commentators, McCulloch is one of the 
clearest Anglophone examples, who think that Sartre can quite legitimately duck the whole 
question of the metaphysics of freedom, and concentrate solely on its phenomenology, on 
what Sartre calls its “evidence”.32 Thus McCulloch: 
So even if, as universal determinists hold, my original decision causes (along with 
subsequent events, of course) my ensuing behaviour, it does not function in my 
consciousness in that way. Yesterday's decision— that was yesterday. Today I must 
either renew it or reject it, in full view of the gaming tables. In itself as it now strikes 
me it has no power over me, whatever its underlying causal role: “it stands behind me 
like a boneless phantom”.33 
Where, then, does Baiasu stand on the charge that Sartre, like Ameriks’ Hegel, simply 
assumes a grade of freedom that can only be delivered by the same Kantian structures which 
he mocks? 
 
In conclusion, this is an insightful and far-ranging text which raises some fascinating issues; I 
very much look forward to hearing a little more from Baiasu on some of the topics sketched 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30 Baiasu 2011:116. 
31 Baiasu 2011:116. 
32 Sartre 1969:40. 
33 McCulloch 1994: 42. 
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